State courts of some 39 states are described in Republican Party of Minnesota Et Al. v. White, Chairperson, Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, et al., 536 U.S. 765, 790, (2001),

In Republican at page 790,

“Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 Cath. U. L. Rev. 361, 379 (2001) (relating anecdotes of lawyers who felt that their contributions to judicial campaigns affected their chance of success in court). Despite these significant problems, 39 States currently employ some form of judicial elections for their appellate courts, general jurisdiction trial courts, or both.”

An impartial judge and a system are detailed in Republican.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JURISDICTION

1.   Jurisdiction is proper in this court according to 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Ku Klux Klanish conduct allows Plaintiff to seek protection in federal court. The plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate "a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978). Congress mandates courts to not sit idly by when it is very straightforward to unearth criminal acts by Attorneys and others in a Title VII case. Congress mandates courts to protect victims of discrimination and retaliation. It is stated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180, (1961),

“It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.”

Also see Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 219, (1970), Republican Party of Minnesota Et Al. v. White, Chairperson, Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, 536 U.S. 765, (2001), and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31, (1980). Representative Perry quoted by the United Stated Supreme Court in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 241, (1972),

“judges, having ears to hear, hear not…”

2.    The doctrine of the United States Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas, echoed in Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 83-84, (2003),

“Attorney fraud calls into question the integrity of the judiciary and erodes public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Accordingly, where an attorney embarks on a scheme to either suborn perjury or intentionally conceal documents, extrinsic fraud constituting a fraud upon the court occurs.”
“ We note because fraud upon the court is an affront to the administration of justice, a litigant who has been defrauded need not establish prejudice. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra; Dixon v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003) (“ . . . the perpetrator of the fraud [upon the court] should not be allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud after the fact.”).”

3.   The doctrine of Hazel-Atlas allows courts to promptly protect victims of discrimination and retaliation from additionally being victims of criminal acts by Attorneys. Title 18 U.S.C. § 242, for example, mandates it as well.

4.   The court has jurisdiction and authority to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff after additionally taking note of the doctrines of the United States Supreme Court in papers such as Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, (1975) and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, (2000). In Reeves at 147,

“… it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Specifically, we stated:

"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Id., at 511.

Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at 517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination"). In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296 (1992);”

5.   In Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F2d.240, 244, (1945),

“Where a Plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the court should endeavor to construe the Plaintiff’s pleading without regard to technicalities”.

Also see Picking at 250. Moreover, Title VII cases are controlled by Albemarle (at 421,)

“Congress' purpose in vesting a variety of "discretionary" powers in the courts was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the "fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible."”

PARTIES

6.   Plaintiff Rahul Singh is a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the State of California.

7.   Defendant Alex McDonald is a justice of the California Court of Appeal. Defendant McDonald is being sued under his official capacity. Defendant McDonald acts under the authority or color of state law.

8.   Defendant Charles Reed is the Chancellor of California State University. Defendant Reed is being sued under his individual and official capacity. Defendant Reed acts under the authority or color of state law.

9.   Defendant Cynthia Aaron is a justice of the California Court of Appeal. Defendant Aaron is being sued under her official capacity. Defendant Aaron acts under the authority or color of state law.

10.   Defendant David T. Hayhurst is the Dean of the College of Engineering at San Diego State University. Defendant Hayhurst is being sued under his individual and official capacity.

11.   Defendant Edward G. Brown is California’s Attorney General with the California Department of Justice. Defendant Brown is being sued under his individual and official capacity. Defendant Brown acts under the authority or color of state law.

12.   Defendant James McIntyre is a justice of the California Court of Appeal. Defendant McIntyre is being sued under his official capacity. Defendant McIntyre acts under the authority or color of state law.

13.   Defendant Jeremy Golden, an Attorney, is a citizen of California. Attorney Jeremy Golden is being sued in his individual capacity.

14.   Defendant Jodi L. Cleesattle, an Attorney with the California Department of Justice is being sued under her individual and official capacity. Attorney Cleesattle acts under the authority or color of state law.

15.   Defendant Joel C. Golden, an Attorney, is a citizen of California. Attorney Joel C. Golden is being sued in his individual capacity.

16.   Defendant Nancy A Marlin is the provost of San Diego State University. Defendant Marlin is being sued under her individual and official capacity.

17.   Defendant Patricia Cowett is a justice of the California Superior Court. Defendant Cowett is being sued under her official capacity. Defendant Cowett acts under the authority or color of state law.

18.   Defendant Richard Strauss is a justice of the California Superior Court. Defendant Strauss is being sued under his official capacity. Defendant Strauss acts under the authority or color of state law.

19.   Defendant Stephen Weber is the president of San Diego State University. Defendant Weber is being sued under his individual and official capacity. Defendant Weber acts under the authority or color of state law.

20.   Defendant Susan Westover is an Attorney with the California State University General Counsel. Defendant Westover is being sued under her individual and official capacity. Defendant Westover acts under the authority or color of state law.

NATURE OF ACTION

21.   A conspiracy, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, has gone unwhipped of justice; immunity is given to crime in Plaintiff’s “Title VII” (quotation marks omitted from here on) case. Plaintiff seeks all equitable relief, including compensatory and punitive damages sustained due to deliberate, knowingly, multiple violations of federal civil rights laws, state laws and regulations, including the deliberate conspiracy to violate these laws and regulations.

SUPPORTING FACTS

22.   Plaintiff, at all times, competently performed his duties and obligations at SDSU, leading to research on the cutting edge of technology and the College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher Award.

23.   Plaintiff was recommended for both tenure and promotion by his Department, his College and his University’s Promotions and Tenure Review Panel. According to Plaintiff’s contract (Exhibit 1) with SDSU, tenure and promotion decisions are based on University Policy File, Section II-A, B, C, D, E and the MOU Articles 11-15. These documents (Exhibit 2, pg. 9) show that SDSU and President Stephen Weber needed compelling reasons to terminate Plaintiff against the wishes of a well informed 8 member University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel given in Exhibit 3.

24.   Plaintiff had hired Attorney Joel C. Golden to litigate his wrongful termination lawsuit (GIC 837030, Superior Court, San Diego) in violation of Cal. Gov. Code 12940(h) that mimics Title VII. See Exhibit 4. Plaintiff is an engineer, not an attorney. That is why Plaintiff had hired attorneys from the very start. Sadly, Attorneys Jeremy Golden and Joel C. Golden corruptly sold out to the other side.

25.   The Action in Singh I was retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination against a female applicant who applied for the distinguished Pine Chair Professorship in Computer Engineering. (GIC 837030.) Plaintiff on April 10, 2003, complained to Equal Opportunity Specialist at SDSU’s Office of Diversity and Equity, Ms. Janice M. Taylor, that SDSU was discriminating against a highly qualified Computer Engineering Female Applicant with 40 journal publications, 100 conference publications, 28 patents and an excellent match to the job description because she was a female.

26.   Plaintiff complained to Ms. Taylor that the female applicant had superior qualifications over the 4 candidates invited for on-campus interviews, of which none was a female. Plaintiff complained to Ms. Taylor that one of the male candidates, a friend of the Associate Dean of the College of Engineering was not even a computer engineer and that another male candidate “Jerry” was interviewed almost a month after Plaintiff had informed his department of the highly qualified Female Applicant.

27.   At the end of February 2005, discovery documents exchanged with regards to Singh I revealed that a letter written by Plaintiff complaining of discrimination by Dean David Hayhurst against Plaintiff was secretly placed in plaintiff’s personnel file. Attorney Golden deceitfully told Plaintiff that he planned on amending the complaint at TRIAL scheduled to take place around September 16, 2005. Because of criminal acts against a Title VII Plaintiff, this had to be filed as Singh II (Superior Court Case GIC 880565.)

28.   SINGH I, GIC 837030, September 2, 2005 Joint Trial Readiness Conference Report, is given here in Exhibit 5. Note on page 22, Exhibit 5, that the First (and only) cause of action is Retaliation under FEHA for complaining about gender discrimination against a highly qualified female applicant (not Plaintiff). Jury verdict form at page 44 indicates accordingly.

29.   Similarly, with regards to discrimination by Dean Hayhurst against Plaintiff (not female applicant), Attorney Westover on August 5, 2005, in SINGH I, GIC 837030, (Exhibit 6, page 53)

“Indeed, the scope of this action is limited to the claims that plaintiff pleaded in his complaint (and further limited by those he set forth in his administrative complaint to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing), …”

30.   The doctrine of Hazel-Atlas is very clear on Attorney fraud. Exhibit 7 shows the complaint filed by Plaintiff with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing on February 23, 2006. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on February 21, 2007 and Superior Court assigned Judge Richard Strauss to Singh II (GIC 880565.)

31.   Attorney Golden’s work in GIC 837030 was tailored to be picked apart by Attorney Westover and Trial Court. Indeed, Trial Court ruled almost all of the evidence inadmissible. See Exhibit 8. Attorney Westover with regards to Plaintiff’s submitted material to oppose Summary Judgment: “The rambling, unfounded, speculative, and inadmissible contents of plaintiff’s 35-page, single spaced declaration aside, there is no admissible evidence of pretext warranting denial of summary judgment.” (Exhibit 6, pg. 55.)

32.   Attorney Golden, in his Motion Opposing Summary Judgment, (see Exhibit 9,) on the first fifteen pages, informed Trial Court that Plaintiff complained about gender discrimination on April 10, 2003 and that Plaintiff was denied tenure and promotion in May 2004. On page sixteen of this motion, (Exhibit 9, pg. 103,) Attorney Golden tried to sell Trial Court his “proximity in time argument”. Attorney Westover’s August 5, 2005 reply to Attorney Golden’s work is provided in Exhibit 6. Attorney Westover, in her reply to Trial Court, (pg. 54,) referring to Attorney Golden’s work, “Singh also misstates the dates of his complaint during the Pine Chair search, claiming he made the complaint on April 10, 2004. (Opposition, pg. 16, lines 3-5.)” Referring to Attorney Golden’s work, Attorney Westover argues that the only explanation plaintiff offers is the proximity in time argument and in doing so, he misstates the dates in evidence. Attorney Westover asserted that these facts prove that there is no proximity of time between the complaint and the ultimate decision. (Exhibit 6, pg. 54, (Reply to Opp. To Motion for S.J.))

33.   Judges Cowett, McDonald, Aaron, McIntyre and Strauss, along with the California Department of Justice, are also aware that SDSU and in-house Attorney, Susan Westover, in February 2005, fraudulently accused SDSU’s in-house Equal Opportunity Specialist, Janice M. Taylor, a law school graduate, of unlawfully destroying all her case files that were supposed to be safely kept for 2 years, including Plaintiff’s April 10, 2003 complaint and subsequent investigation file regarding gender discrimination against a highly qualified female applicant with 28 patents, 40 journal papers and 100 conference papers. See Exhibits 10-12. In Exhibit 12, Dr. Bonnie Zimmerman is the SDSU Whistle-Blower officer reporting to Defendant Weber.

34.   Plaintiff in good faith had given Attorney Golden, a distinct looking, official SDSU Office of Diversity and Equity Handbook (red in color) which stated that records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity and Equity (ODE) for 2 years. Ms. Taylor worked for ODE reporting directly to the Provost and the President. Ms. Taylor was also accused of deleting all her work email and changing password on her computer. Attorney Golden has read Plaintiff’s Red Handbook in Plaintiff’s presence and noted that records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity and Equity (ODE) for 2 years. Attorney Golden would not exchange this document in discovery despite requests by Plaintiff. Attorney Golden deceitfully reasoned with Plaintiff that he did not want Defendant to know that they had this document and that he was concealing it from Defendant for possible impeachment at trial.

35.   At the August 2005 summary judgment, Judge Cowett ruled pages and pages of simple pleadings and evidence submitted in support of Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants summary judgment motion as inadmissible. Judge Cowett granted Provost summary judgment and decided plaintiff owed Provost 5000.00 dollars.

36.   Attorney Golden attempted to lose all of summary judgment that took place on August 12, 2005. Judge Cowett read Plaintiff’s single spaced declaration. Attorney Golden nearly succeeded in Plaintiff owing SDSU roughly 70,000.00 dollars in costs. On several occasions, Attorney Golden discouraged Plaintiff from including a declaration to defeat Summary Judgment. Attorney Golden cleverly left out key information including perjury and credibility issues of key administrators responsible for wrongfully terminating Plaintiff. Attorney Golden’s prior work roughly $30,000.00 worth, plus future earnings were at stake, not to mention Plaintiff’s entire professional career. Attorney Golden was working on a contingency basis (35%). Attorney Golden flew out of town on vacation well prior to the deadline imposed by the court for submitting documents opposing motion for summary judgment. Attorney Golden completely surprised and stunned Plaintiff by only giving an hours notice before leaving town on vacation. Plaintiff was made to serve Defendant with summary judgment papers, contrary to what Attorney Golden signed under penalty of perjury in the proof of service, prior to fraudulently abandoning Plaintiff. See Exhibit 13.

37.   Plaintiff fired Attorney Golden. Afterwards, on September 15, 2005 when Attorney Golden returned Plaintiff’s material to Plaintiff, he kept/stole Plaintiff’s red Handbook and returned a different red Handbook stating search records should be kept for 1 year. Attorney Joel and/or Jeremy Golden removed Plaintiff’s distinct sticky markers from Plaintiff’s red Handbook and placed them in the tampered Handbook favoring defendants.

38.   Defendants and Attorney Westover, on September 30, 2005, followed by now fraudulently including in their trial exhibit list, a red Handbook that was never exchanged.

39.   In response to Plaintiff’s October 7, 2005 declaration to Judge Cowett under the penalty of perjury, Defendants in-house Attorney Susan Westover committed perjury to trial court by stating that Plaintiff actually produced the red Handbook to the University in its request for production to him.

40.   A true and correct copy of Attorney Westover’s October 10, 2005 declaration is also produced in Exhibit 14,

DECLARATION OF SUSAN WESTOVER

“I, Susan Westover, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of California and I am University Counsel with the Office of General Counsel for the California State University. In that capacity I represent defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University. If called upon to testify, I could and would competently testify to the following matters, of which I have personal knowledge.

2. In his motion in limine, plaintiff claims that his lawyer may have tampered with the evidence by taking plaintiff’s “red SDSU faculty recruitment and hiring procedures handbook” and swapping it for another version. Since 1999, there have only been two versions of that handbook. The one that governed the Pine Chair search involved in this case is the version issued in 1999 (and the one included in the trial exhibits as Exhibit No. 170). While the handbook was recently updated in 2004, that version is irrelevant here, since this search took place in 2003. In any event, I have had no exchanges of information with Joel Golden regarding this particular document, and find it hard to believe that Mr. Golden somehow got an extra copy of a different version of the red handbook and switched it for the one that plaintiff originally had. He certainly never got any red handbooks from me.

3. In his motion, plaintiff also claims that his former counsel provided me with a list of questions to be asked of University witnesses. I have no idea what Dr. Singh is talking about, as I have never received from Mr. Golden any lists of questions for witnesses.

4. Finally, in his motion, plaintiff claims that the document entitled “SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring” (July 30, 1999) (Trial Exhibit No. 170) was not exchanged during discovery. Plaintiff never asked for faculty recruitment and hiring policies or procedures during the discovery process. A true and correct of his only request for production of documents to the University is attached as Exhibit A. Notably absent is any request for such a document. Regardless, plaintiff knew of the existence of the document since he actually produced that document to the University in response its request for production to him.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 10, 2005, at Long Beach, California. …”

41.   Plaintiff never gave any red Handbook to the University. It fraudulently appeared in Defendants trial exhibits list after Attorney Golden stole Plaintiff’s red Handbook and returned to him a tampered red Handbook favoring SDSU.

42.   Attorney Susan Westover committed perjury, i.e., Fraud Upon the Court. In hiding unlawful fraudulent attorney collusion, & concealing and tampering of evidence by attorneys (also Fraud Upon the Court,) Attorney Westover lied and wrote to trial court under penalty of perjury that Plaintiff actually produced the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook to the University in response its request for production to him.

43.   The court should note that because of Fraud Upon the Court, Attorney Westover in her ANSWER to this COMPLAINT will not be able to present as an exhibit the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

44.   The court should also note that in Attorney Westover’s October 10, 2005 declaration given above, there is no “Exhibit B” containing the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

45.   Exhibit 15 shows (reduced in size) the cover with the title of the tampered red Handbook returned by Attorney Golden.

46.   Exhibit 16 shows page 5 of the tampered red Handbook.

47.   Exhibit 17 shows page 8 of the tampered red Handbook. Attorneys Joel and/or Jeremy Golden removed Plaintiff’s distinct sticky markers from Plaintiff’s red Handbook and placed them in the tampered red Handbook favoring SDSU.

48.   The court should note that SDSU around May 26, 2005 filed a motion for Summary Judgment which made no mention of the red Handbook or any of its procedures because that would favor Plaintiff. Around August 5, 2005 SDSU replied to motion opposing Summary Judgment and did not mention the red Handbook or any of its procedures because that would favor Plaintiff. See Exhibit 6. On September 2, 2005, SDSU provided trial court an exhibit list for joint trial readiness conference that did not include the red Handbook as it favored Plaintiff. See Exhibit 5. Also note that on September 2, 2005, Attorney Golden provided trial court with Plaintiff’s exhibit list for joint trial readiness conference that did not include the red Handbook.

49.    Attorney Golden, on September 15, 2005, returned to Plaintiff a tampered red Handbook that states,

“ “Request for Approval to negotiate” is approved by Dean and submitted to Provost for each candidate to be negotiated with.”

50.   Also contrary to page 5 of the tampered red Handbook, Plaintiff’s red Handbook stated that,

“Dean approves the recommendation, modifies it, or asks for further information. Forwards “Request to Negotiate” form to Provost. Provost accepts recommendations, asks for further information, or rejects recommendation. Notifies Dean and ODE by copy of “Request”.”

51.   Attorney Golden and Plaintiff had often discussed Plaintiff’s red Handbook since SDSU and in-house Attorney Westover on February 18, 2005 had repeatedly accused in-house Equal Opportunity Specialist, Ms. Taylor, of unlawful acts, (Exhibit 10,)

“The only relevant investigation materials would be those involving the Pine Chair Search. However, when Ms. Taylor left her employment at SDSU, she apparently took with her or otherwise disposed of all her case files, and left no documentation at SDSU. Thus, despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, CSU is unable to comply with this request, since the documents are no longer in CSU’s possession, custody, or control.”… “Janice Taylor’s last known address and telephone number are 11837 La Colina Road, San Diego, CA 92131; (858) 566-3244.”

Also see Exhibits 11-12. Attorney Golden and Plaintiff had discussed that an employer must be held responsible for safe keeping of files regarding employment and discrimination and that the University was cleverly depriving them of key evidence such as Exhibit 18. Plaintiff had told Attorney Golden that two signatures missing in Exhibit 18, the “Request to Negotiate” form are of Provost Nancy Marlin and Dean David Hayhurst, individuals that terminated him and that this alone makes for a powerful case to the court. Plaintiff had told Attorney Golden that a completed “Request to Negotiate” form with Dean Hayhurst’s and Provost Marlin’s signatures filed with the Office of Diversity & Equity (ODE) and to be kept for 2 years by ODE would show that Dean of the College re-ranked candidates so that the male friend of Associate Dean was poised to be the distinguished Pine Professor in Computer Engineering. Plaintiff had told Attorney Golden that the files would show that Provost was well aware of his complaining about gender discrimination in the Pine Chair Search.

52.   Dean Hayhurst on May 25, 2005, under the penalty of perjury, (Exhibit 19,)

“I never had any reason to believe or suspect that Dr. Singh was one of the faculty members who approached Jan Taylor.”

Ms. Taylor under penalty of perjury on July 18, 2005, (Exhibit 20, page 120,)

“Dean Hayhurst asked me who it was that complained about the failure to interview the female candidate and I informed him I needed to keep the complainant’s name confidential.

I believe Dean Hayhurst knew that Dr. Singh was the one who complained because after I told him it was confidential he asked, “Was it Singh?”. ”

“On or about April 23, 2003, I met with Dean Hayhurst and Associate Vice president of Faculty Affairs, Dr. Dean O. Popp to discuss Dean Hayhurst’s role in the faculty search for the Pine Chair and that he had re-ranked Dr. xxxxx, a male friend of Associate Dean Gordon Lee, so that xxxxx was poised to be the Pine Professor of Computer Engineering and that there were complaints about that as well as the failure to interview the female candidate which could be construed as gender discrimination.”

53.   On June 30, 2005, Dean David Hayhurst under oath stated he was not aware of a vote of no confidence given to him at the University of South Alabama (Exhibit 21, Hayhurst Dep.) A vote of no confidence results in one having to resign as Dean; it is impossible not to be aware of getting a vote of no confidence.

54.   Provost Marlin was aware that Dean Hayhurst had received a vote of no confidence from the faculty at the University of South Alabama prior to hiring him. (Exhibit 22.) Despite knowing this Provost Marlin selected him out of five candidates, including a female and a part Hispanic. Provost Marlin unlawfully terminated Plaintiff on May 4, 2004 and by publicly concurring in Dean Hayhurst’s unlawful termination recommendation relating to Plaintiff, Provost Marlin additionally demonstrated support of Dean Hayhurst to Plaintiff’s and the University’s detriment. Plaintiff’s contract with SDSU clearly indicates that a Dean of a College has no role in tenure and reappointment issues. See Exhibit 2, pg. 7.

55.   Judges Cowett, McDonald, Aaron, McIntyre and Strauss have never seen the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

56.   GIC 837030 assigned to Judge Cowett and reviewed by Justices Alex McDonald, Cynthia Aaron, and James McIntyre is described by the table of contents provided in Plaintiff’s petition for review of GIC 837030 to California Supreme Court (Exhibit 23,)

"TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................iii

I. PETITION FOR REVIEW........................................................................1

II. ISSUES PRESENTED..........................................................................1

III. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED.............................................3

IV. FACTS...................................................................................................9

V. LEGAL ARGUMENT.............................................................................9



1. The Court of Appeals erred because discrimination/retaliation cases with denial of rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment and attorney fraud are controlled by the United States Supreme Court decisions in papers such as Reeves, Albemarle, and Hazel-Atlas. The 14th Amendment always controls.....................................................................................................9

2. The Court of Appeals erred by not accounting for Defendant and in-house Attorney Westover fraudulently accusing in-house Equal Opportunity Specialist Ms. Janice M. Taylor of unlawfully taking or disposing all her case files, including Plaintiff’s file regarding gender discrimination against the highly qualified female applicant...................................................10

3. The Court of Appeals erred by failing to note that Plaintiff’s attorney attempted to lose Aug. 12, 2005 Summary Judgment........................15

4. The Court of Appeals erred by refusing to unearth attorney fraud via C.C.P. Section 909 by issuing a simple order requiring Defendant’s attorney to produce a document that Defendant’s attorney under the penalty of perjury has stated that Plaintiff actually produced to the Defendant in response its request for production to Plaintiff. See Exhibit 2. At the very least the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case back to trial court...............16

5. The Court of Appeals erred because denial of the fundamental rights to U.S. citizens including “Title VII” Plaintiffs’, the right to be heard, right to an impartial judge, right to due process and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is also reversible error.....16

A. On September 26, 2005, trial court was not willing to give Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard and the court quashed the trial subpoena for Ms. Taylor and forbade any other means of extracting information from Ms. Taylor..........................16

B. At the October 13, 2005 Trial Call, Plaintiff pleaded for a settlement hearing with a judge but trial court was not willing to give Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. Trial court without hearing from Plaintiff, denied Plaintiff’s plea for a settlement hearing with a judge because Plaintiff was Pro Per..........19

6. The Court of Appeals erred because conduct that causes absence of necessary witnesses is extrinsic fraud. After trial court took the case off the Trial Calendar on October 13, 2005, Ms. Taylor came out of hiding and got caught at a local restaurant on October 21, 2005. Extrinsic fraud also demands reversal......................................................................................................26

7. The Court of Appeals erred by not accounting for denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in their C.C.P. Section 664.6 arguments. Stated differently, no requirements are met, let alone the so-called “statutory requirements” when there is denial of rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. When there is Attorney fraud. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that statutory requirements of Section 664.6 mentioned in say Assemi were met here. The court of Appeals erred in assuming that Kohn is controlling for the Defendant................................................................28

8. The Court of Appeals erred by not reviewing de novo....................31

VI. Conclusion........................................................................................31”

57.   Criminal acts against a Title VII Plaintiff had been provided to the justices with specificity. Appellant’s opening brief, Respondent’s brief, and Appellant’s reply brief in GIC 837030 are provided in Exhibits 24, 25, and 26, respectively.

58.   Attorney Westover around November 20, 2006, informed the Court of Appeals Panel regarding the thrust of argument at the hearing, (Exhibit 27,)

“The University’s positions are fully briefed. Oral argument by CSU’s counsel will be limited to rebuttal of false or erroneous statements by Dr. Singh.”

59.    Plaintiff on November 22, 2006 informed the Court of Appeals Panel regarding the thrust of argument at the hearing, (Exhibit 28,)

“FRAUD UPON THE COURT. AT THE ORAL ARGUMENT HEARING, RESPONDENT SHOULD PRODUCE THE RED JULY 30, 1999 SDSU OFFICE OF DIVERSITY & EQUITY PROCEDURES FOR FACULTY RECRUITMENT AND HIRING HANDBOOK SUPPOSEDLY PRODUCED BY APPELLANT TO THE UNIVERSITY IN RESPONSE ITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO HIM. SEE PAGE 38 OF APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF. ALSO SEE TABLE OF CONTENTS.”

60.   Exhibit 29 shows Defendant’s February 6, 2007 request for continuance of Oral Argument informing the judicial system that Attorney Westover will be vacationing with her husband’s law firm,

“I am taking a vacation to the State of Florida from March 7, 2007 through and including March 14, 2007. My vacation is pre-planned, pre-paid, and non-refundable. The trip is taken in conjunction with my husband’s law firm’s annual partner retreat, so I have no flexibility in the dates of the trip.”

61.   Plaintiff on Feb. 13, 2007 informed the Court of Appeals that it was imperative that Attorney Westover be present at the Oral Argument Hearing, (Exhibit 30,)

        “Appellant request’s the court to schedule the Oral Argument Hearing to March 15 or preferably, March 16, 2007. Appellant also requests permission to independently videotape (additional to court videotape) the Oral Argument.

        It is the duty of all courts to eradicate Discrimination and Retaliation & Fraud Upon the Court. Oral Arguments are only held on select days of the month and April 2007 may be the only choice.

        Perjury by Attorneys, concealing & tampering of evidence by Attorneys, and unlawful fraudulent collusion between Plaintiff’s Attorney and Defendant are acts that constitute Fraud Upon the Court.

        In other words, it is imperative that Respondent’s Attorney Susan Westover be present at the Oral Argument Hearing and present to the Appeal Court the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Appellant to the University in response its request for production to him. Attorney Susan Westover committed perjury, i.e., Fraud Upon the Court. In hiding unlawful fraudulent Attorney collusion, & concealing and tampering of evidence by Attorneys (also Fraud Upon the Court,) Attorney Westover lied and wrote to Trial Court under penalty of perjury that Appellant actually produced the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook to the University in response its request for production to him.

        If the judge ruling on this request does not sit on the panel, it will help to read a sample of what is contained in the briefs, prior to making a ruling. In particular, a sample of Appellant’s Opening Brief, starting at page 36,

“V. Evidence tampering by Attorneys
        Appellant had given key evidence to Attorney Golden around July 2004, namely a distinct red colored Office of Diversity & Equity Handbook and Attorney Golden has read it in Appellant’s presence and noted that (JA-1874, 2137)

a) faculty search files are to be kept for 2 years by the Office of Diversity and Equity, and
a) “Dean approves the recommendation, modifies it, or asks for further information. Forwards “Request to Negotiate” form to Provost. Provost accepts recommendations, asks for further information, or rejects recommendation. Notifies Dean and ODE by copy of “Request”.”

Attorney Golden and Appellant had often discussed this red Handbook and its contents as stated above in a) and b) since SDSU on February 18, 2005 had repeatedly written, (JA-1349,)

“The only relevant investigation materials would be those involving the Pine Chair Search. However, when Ms. Taylor left her employment at SDSU, she apparently took with her or otherwise disposed of all her case files, and left no documentation at SDSU. Thus, despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, CSU is unable to comply with this request, since the documents are no longer in CSU’s possession, custody, or control.”… “Janice Taylor’s last known address and telephone number are 11837 La Colina Road, San Diego, CA 92131; (858) 566-3244.”

Attorney Golden and Appellant had discussed that an employer must be held responsible for safe keeping of files regarding employment and discrimination and that the University was cleverly depriving them of key evidence such as (JA-2137.) Appellant had told Attorney Golden that such a completed “Request to Negotiate” form filed with the Office of Diversity and to be kept for 2 years by the Office of Diversity would show that Dean Hayhurst re-ranked candidates so that the male friend of Associate Dean Gordon Lee was poised to be the distinguished Pine Professor in Computer Engineering. Appellant had told Attorney Golden that the files would show that Provost Marlin was well aware of his complaining about gender discrimination in the Pine Chair Search. (JA-2137.)
         Appellant had told Attorney Golden that two signatures missing in (JA XX,) the “Request to Negotiate” form are of Provost Marlin and Dean Hayhurst, individuals that terminated him and that this alone makes for a powerful case to the court. (JA-2137.)
         SDSU on or about May 26, 2005 filed a motion for Summary Judgment which made no mention of the red Handbook or any of it’s procedures such as those listed in a) and b) above because that would favor Appellant. (JA-1874, 2138.)
         On or about August 5, 2005 SDSU replied to motion opposing Summary Judgment and did not mention the red Handbook or any of its procedures because that would favor Appellant. (JA-1874, 2138.)
         On September 2, 2005, SDSU provided Trial Court an exhibit list for joint trial readiness conference that did not include the red Handbook as it favored Appellant, see (JA-1874, 2138.)
        Attorney Golden had insisted on not producing the red Handbook to the University. Attorney Golden had told Appellant he did not want SDSU-CSU to know that we had a copy. Attorney Golden was supposedly concealing the red Handbook from Respondent for possible impeachment. On September 2, 2005 Attorney Golden provided Trial Court with Appellant’s exhibit list for joint trial readiness conference that did not include the red Handbook, see (JA-1911.)
        On September 12, 2005, following the sham deposition of Ms. Taylor, Appellant relieved Attorney Golden as his attorney. On September 15, 2005 Judge Charles Hayes approves substitution of Attorney. Later that morning of Sept. 15, 2005, Attorney Golden returned Appellant’s documents to him. Attorney Joel C. Golden and/or Attorney Jeremy Golden kept the red Handbook that Appellant had provided them around July 2004, and on September 15, 2005 returned a different red Handbook which favored SDSU. (JA-1875.)
        Attorneys Joel and/or Jeremy Golden removed Appellant’s distinct sticky markers from Appellants red Handbook and placed them in the tampered Handbook favoring SDSU. Attorney Golden returned to Appellant a red Handbook that stated that search records are to be kept for 1 year and that the “ “Request for Approval to negotiate” is approved by Dean and submitted to Provost for each candidate to be negotiated with.” (JA-1875.)
        On September 30, 2005 SDSU provided Trial Court with their exhibit list for joint trial readiness conference that now included the red Handbook that was never exchanged, see (JA-1875.)
        Trial Court was informed in a telephone call prior to submitting October 7, 2005 motion, of evidence tampering and unlawful Attorney collusion jeopardizing Appellant’s right to a fair trial. Notably, Trial Court was made aware of Attorney misconduct on September 26, 2005, (RT-502,) October 7, 2005, (JA-1871,) October 11, 2005, (JA-1945,) October 20, 2005, (JA-1985,) October 26, 2005, (JA-2111,) December 1, 2005, (JA-2130, 2329,) December 5, 2005, (JA-2529), and finally December 9, 2005. (RT-1001.) ”

CAL. GOV. CODE 12946

Since filing Appellant’s Reply to this review court in November 2006, Appellant has discovered that there exists Cal. Gov. Code 12946. It states,

“It shall be an unlawful practice for employers, … to fail to maintain and preserve any and all applications, personnel, membership, or employment referral records and files for a minimum period of two years after the records and files are initially created or received, or for employers to fail to retain personnel files of applicants … ”

The review court will not find any mention of Cal. Gov. Code 12946 in any pleadings or rulings prior to this current request for continuance of oral argument. Trial Court had a duty to eradicate,

a) Discrimination & Retaliation, and
b) Fraud Upon the Court.

Review of pleadings and rulings indicate that as early as August 12, 2005, at the Summary Judgment hearing, Trial Court should have disciplined both Plaintiff’s Attorney Joel Golden and Defendant’s Attorney Susan Westover.

CONCLUSION

Appellant had requested that the Appeal Court issue an order re-instating Appellant with Tenure and Promotion in tune with Cal. Gov. Code 12940(h), Appellant’s Contract, Appellant’s Department, Appellant’s College, and Appellant’s University. Appellant adds Cal. Gov. Code 12946 to this list.

AUTHORITY

A) In (Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., (2000) 530 U.S. 133, 147,)

“… it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Specifically, we stated:
"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Id., at 511.
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at 517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination"). In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296 (1992);”

B) In (Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., (2000) 530 U.S. 133, 153,)

“Given the evidence in the record supporting petitioner, we see no reason to subject the parties to an additional round of litigation before the Court of Appeals rather than to resolve the matter here.”

C) In (Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (1982), 458 U.S. 219, 226,)

“"court must exercise this power `in light of the large objectives of the Act,'" and, in doing so, must be guided by "meaningful standards" enforced by "thorough appellate review." Id., at 416 (opinion of the Court) (citations omitted).”

D) In (Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, (1975) 422 U.S. 405, 420,)

“A Section-by-Section Analysis introduced by Senator Williams to accompany the Conference Committee Report on the 1972 Act [Page 422 U.S. 405, 421] strongly reaffirmed the "make whole" purpose of Title VII:


"The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706 (g) the courts have stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination." 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972). ”

E) The United States Supreme Court leaves no doubt, see Albemarle at page 421,

“As this makes clear, Congress' purpose in vesting a variety of "discretionary" powers in the courts was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the "fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible." ”

F) In (Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (1982), 458 U.S. 219, 226)

“Moreover, as we emphasized in Albemarle Paper, in Title VII cases


"such discretionary choices are not left to a court's `inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to [Page 458 U.S. 219, 227] be guided by sound legal principles.' United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.). . . . "It is true that `[e]quity eschews mechanical rules . . . [and] depends on flexibility.' Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 O.S. 392, 396 (1946). But when Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes and not `equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's foot.' Important national goals would be frustrated by a regime of discretion that `produce[d] different results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970)." Id., at 416-417 (footnote omitted).”

Dated February 13, 2007                    Respectfully submitted, …”

62.   Justices of the California Court of Appeal prevented access to the courts in Plaintiff’s Title VII case by ordering the court clerk to not file Plaintiff’s March 1, 2007 pleadings requesting court order to catch Fraud Upon the Court, (Exhibit 31,) where Plaintiff wrote,

“Evidence tampering by Attorneys is a criminal act.

It is also a crime for an Attorney to lie under the penalty of perjury in hiding unlawful fraudulent collusion between Plaintiff’s Attorney and Defendant, and concealing & tampering of evidence by Attorneys.

At the Oral Hearing, Attorney Susan Westover will practice law before the Court of Appeals. It is the duty of all courts to ensure that victims of discrimination/retaliation are additionally not victims of fraud perpetrated by Officers of the Court. Such fraud constitutes Fraud Upon the Court.

Appellant requests an order from this court directing Respondent and their Attorney Susan Westover as follows,

Court Order: Present to the Appeal Court the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Appellant to the University in response its request for production to him.

The order is necessary to catch criminal acts by Attorneys in a discrimination/retaliation case. Details have been provided in Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellant’s Reply Brief, and the previous request submitted to this Appeal Court. This request is simple. As the court knows, Attorney Westover would have returned by then from vacation with her husband’s law firm.

Fraud upon this court has been perpetrated; the very temple of justice has been defiled.



AUTHORITY

At page 421 of (Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, (1975) 422 U.S. 405,) the highest court of the land stated in a “TITLE VII” case,


“As this makes clear, Congress' purpose in vesting a variety of "discretionary" powers in the courts was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the "fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible." ”

The Unites States Supreme Court in (Hormel v. Helvering, (1941) 312 U.S. 552, 557,)

“Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice.”

Moreover, courts have the power to conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether they have been the victims of fraud. (Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., (1946) 328 U.S. 575, 580.) Also see generally, (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., (1944) 328 U.S. 238.)

Dated March 1, 2007                        Respectfully submitted, …”

63.    The Justices of the Court of Appeals via the court clerk, on March 1, 2007, (Exhibit 32,)

“Dear Counsel:

               The court has requested the clerk of the court return appellant’s “Appellant Requesting Court Order To Catch Fraud Upon The Court”, to appellant unfiled.

                                                            STEPHEN M. KELLY, CLERK …”

64.    At the April 12, 2007, Oral Agument Hearing,

… SINGH: HERE IS THE TAMPERED RED HANDBOOK THAT MY ATTORNEY GAVE TO ME AFTER I DISCHARGED HIM. IT STATES THAT RECORDS ARE TO BE KEPT FOR 1 YEAR. THE RED HANDBOOK THAT I HAD GIVEN MY ATTORNEY STATED THAT RECORDS ARE TO BE KEPT BY THE OFFICE OF DIVERSITY AND EQUITY FOR 2 YEARS.

I NEVER GAVE ANY RED HANDBOOKS TO THE UNIVERSITY. ATTORNEY SUSAN WESTOVER COMMITTED PERJURY, FRAUD UPON THE COURT. SEE HER DECLARATION GIVEN AS EXHIBIT 1 IN APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF.

I URGE THIS COURT TO PLEASE ERADICATE FRAUD UPON THE COURT. DEMAND HER TO PRODUCE THE RED JULY 30, 1999 SDSU OFFICE OF DIVERSITY AND EQUITY PROCEDURES FOR FACULTY RECRUITMENT AND HIRING HANDBOOK SUPPOSEDLY PRODUCED BY PLAINTIFF TO THE UNIVERSITY IN RESPONSE ITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO HIM.

HERE WE HAVE FRAUD PERPETRATED SADLY BY OFFICERS OF THE COURT THAT CANNOT BE UNSCREWED NO MATTER WHAT ONE TRIES. IN ANY LITIGATION, THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ECHOING THE OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SAID IN CHEWNING V. FORD, ATTORNEY FRAUD CALLS INTO QUESTION THE INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND ERODES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE FAIRNESS OF OUR SYSTEM. QUOTING HAZEL, WE NOTE BECAUSE FRAUD UPON THE COURT IS AN AFFRONT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, A LITIGANT WHO HAS BEEN DEFRAUDED NEED NOT ESTABLISH PREJUDICE. AND IT ALSO QUOTED ANOTHER CASE, THE PERPETRATOR OF THE FRAUD UPON THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISPUTE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRA FRAUD AFTER-THE-FACT…

65.    At the April 12, 2007 hearing, Fraud Upon the Court was again evident from Attorney Westover’s rebuttal. Attorney Westover did not present to the Court of Appeals the red Handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him. The Court of Appeals refused to blow the whistle on Attorney fraud and lower court, refused to carryout their duties as instructed by Title VII and various U.S. Supreme Court rulings,

WESTOVER: SUSAN WESTOVER. GOOD AFTERNOON. I BELIEVE MY BRIEF ADDRESSES THE ISSUES ON THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT QUITE THOROUGHLY SO IF THERE ARE UNLESS THERE

JUSTICE MCINTYRE: WHAT IS YOUR VIEW WHAT THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS?

WESTOVER: THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER THERE IS A BINDING SETTLEMENT UNDER AND WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENFORCED IT UNDER 664.6

JUSTICE MCINTYRE: YES. ALL RIGHT. IS THERE OTHER LITIGATION THAT THAT MR. SINGH HAS INVOLVED WITH THIS, WITH THE UNIVERSITY OR AGAINST HIS LAWYER OR SOMEBODY ELSE.

WESTOVER: ABOUT A MONTH AND A HALF AGO HE FILED THIS EXACT SAME LAWSUIT AGAIN IN SUPERIOR COURT ALLEGING RETALIATION, DISCRIMINATION FOR DENAIL OF TENURE SO I AM JUST WAITING FOR THE OPINION ON THIS TO COME FROM THIS COURT TO HOPEFULLY GET THAT DISMISSED BUT HE IS REFILED IN SUPERIOR COURT THE SAME SUIT BUT HE HASN’T FILED ANYTHING AGAINST HIS FORMER COUNSEL.

JUSTICE MCINTYRE: ALL RIGHT.

JUSTICE MCDONALD: THANK YOU.

WESTOVER: THANK YOU.

66.    Full transcript of Plaintiff’s exchange with the Appeal Panel is under preparation from audio provided by the Appeals Court.

67.    The three justices of the Court of Appeals on April 17, 2007 went on to reward criminal acts against Title VII Plaintiff by awarding costs on appeal to Defendant. See Exhibit 33. Appellant’s request for rehearing in Court of Appeals is provided in Exhibit 34. The order denying rehearing is given in Exhibit 35.

68.    It is antithetical to the role of California Department of Justice to willfully aid and abet the most egregious offender of Title VII. There is no affidavit from Attorney Jodi L. Cleesattle with an exhibit the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

69.    On or about August 4, 2004, prior to filing the lawsuit, Attorney Golden had summarized to SDSU President Stephen Weber, (Exhibit 36,)

“Underlying all of the above is the fact that Dr. Singh deserved the requested promotion and tenure. He received positive recommendations from the Department Committee, Department Chair, College Committee and University Committee. Prior to his complaining about not calling the female applicant for an interview, on January 13, 2003, Dean Hayhurst, in his performance review of Dr. Singh, recommended that he continue publishing in well-recognized peer-reviewed journals, that he seek funding for his research projects, that he begin incorporating graduate students in his research and that he conduct research separately and independently from his dissertation advisor. Dr. Singh did all of those acts which the Dean dismissed on January 14, 2004 as “last minute efforts” by stating, “Clearly many of the efforts to establish a research program have occurred in your final probationary year and do not indicate a sustained commitment to professional growth.”

I understand Dean Hayhurst is relatively new to SDSU and that he had some problems with the faculty at Southern Alabama. Despite knowing this the Provost selected him out of five candidates and by publicly concurring in his recommendation relating to Dr. Singh, the Provost demonstrated support of him to Dr. Singh’s and the University’s detriment. Unfortunately, Dean Hayhurst’s motivation was retaliatory and unlawful in violation of California Government Code Section 12940 et seq. which prohibits discrimination and/or retaliation against an individual who opposes an act that he believes may violate the anti-discrimination laws of California.”

70.    Attorney Golden in his Motion Opposing Summary Judgment cleverly left out perjury, impeachment and credibility issues of top administrators responsible for terminating Appellant; issues once important to Attorney Golden. They were important causing Attorney Westover to file in court a Motion in Limine on September 13, 2005 prohibiting any mention of Dean Hayhurst’s vote of no confidence. Attorney Golden, of course, in his Motion Opposing Summary Judgment, had left out such information, see for example, (Exhibit 9, pg. 94, Lines 11-16.)

71.    Attorney Golden insisted on highlighting an email, (Exhibit 37, pg. 452,) provided by SDSU from Dean Hayhurst to Provost Marlin. Moreover, Attorney Golden insisted on highlighting it in a way different than what he was told by Plaintiff. Attorney Golden’s arguments (Exhibit 9, pgs. 101-102,) as given in his motion opposing Summary Judgment tend to help SDSU. Plaintiff’s explanation is given in Paragraphs 110 – 120 of his declaration, (Exhibit 38, pgs. 473-475.)

72.    Attorney Golden should have highlighted the retaliation and termination campaign endured by Plaintiff starting April 10, 2003. Attorney Golden should have highlighted Plaintiff’s contract with SDSU.

73.    Attorney Golden filed a “Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Material Facts in Dispute”. California Rules of Court require a “Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts”. Plaintiff had asked Attorney Golden to move the court to grant Summary Judgment reinstating Plaintiff in tune with his contract with SDSU. Several key perjuries had been committed. Provost Marlin had impeached herself and key evidence had been destroyed or disposed.

74.    Notably in Exhibit 10, right after accusing Ms. Taylor of unlawful conduct, Attorney Westover provided Ms. Taylor’s address and telephone number. Ms. Taylor was supposedly not contacted prior to making such an accusation around February 18, 2005 and she had quit her employment as Professor at National University around this time. Ms. Taylor’s telephone was disconnected. No one could apparently find Ms. Taylor. Moreover, with Ms. Taylor missing, there would be no way to authenticate any emails between Plaintiff and Ms. Taylor as well. SDSU accused her of deleting all her work related emails, and changing password on her computer.

75.    At “Mediation Day”, May 25, 2005, Attorney Golden told Plaintiff it was crucial to locate Ms. Taylor. Mr. Golden mentioned that his private investigator is really good and should be able to locate Ms. Taylor. That day Plaintiff gave Attorney Golden 500 dollars for locating Ms. Taylor that Attorney Golden thought was more than enough. Attorney Golden had Ms. Taylor’s last known address of 11837 La Colina Road, San Diego, CA 92131, and her phone number 858-566-3244 from discovery documents.

76.    Provost Marlin on May 26, 2005 committed perjury in her affidavit by emphatically informing Trial Court that, (Exhibit 39,)

“Janice Taylor was never my secretary or in any way reported to me. The purported identification of her as “Sec. To Provost” in the minutes of a faculty meeting of the ECE Department is an error. Ms. Taylor did not work in academic affairs in any capacity. She reported to the Director of the Office of Equity and Diversity, who reported to President’s office, which is a separate division of the University.”

77.    Attorney Westover on May 28, 2005, highlighted Provost Marlin’s declaration to Trial Court by writing that,

“Taylor was never Marlin’s secretary or in any way reported to her or anyone in Academic Affairs. Taylor and her department, the office of Equity and Diversity, reported to the president’s office.”

78.    Attorney Westover moved Trial Court for Summary Judgment on May 28, 2005,

“Here, plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between his alleged complaint to Jan Taylor in April 2003 and Provost Marlin’s decision to deny tenure and promotion in May 2004 in order to survive summary judgment. This he cannot do.”

79.    Defendant’s fraudulently schemed so Plaintiff would lose Summary Judgment. Ms. Taylor was not to arrive in town until Summary Judgment was over. However that scheme failed because on June 23, 2005, Plaintiff without any help from SDSU, or his own attorneys located Ms. Taylor in the legal studies department at National University. Through that department (Plaintiff was persistent) Plaintiff contacted Ms. Taylor. She indicated her address of 11837 La Colina Road, and telephone number (858) 566-3244 were good and emphatically denied to Plaintiff and Attorney Golden that her telephone was disconnected. Ms. Taylor claimed she was unemployed. Notably, Ms. Taylor was still looking for employment in September 2005. Ms. Taylor quit her job as professor in February of 2005 without securing another job. As late as September 9, 2005 Attorney Golden had yet to hear from his private investigator regarding Ms. Taylor, and had avoided answering Plaintiff’s questions on this matter.

80.    Provost Marlin, prior to Summary Judgment, was impeached on June 30, 2005 when she admitted that she did meet with Janice Taylor and receives reports from the Office of Diversity and Equity. (See Exhibit 40.)

81.    To the dismay of Plaintiff’s opponents, Plaintiff did submit a declaration (Exhibit 38) despite Attorney Golden’s attempts and avoided owing SDSU roughly 70,000.00 dollars. Student support for Plaintiff caused SDSU on September 13, 2005 to file a Motion in Limine to preclude courtroom spectators from inappropriate communications with the jury.

FEDERAL

82.    Relying on the very low acceptance rate by Supreme Courts, rights guaranteed by the U.S. constitution are denied; criminal acts are perpetrated upon Title VII Plaintiff without fear. The California Supreme Court regarding GIC 837030 has denied review. Plaintiff is petitioning for review of GIC 837030 in the United States Supreme Court. If the U.S. Supreme Court denies review, then this federal lawsuit automatically includes GIC 837030 (retaliation for complaining about discrimination against female applicant) as a suit in equity by virtue of the doctrine of Hazel-Atlas and others, including the Ku Klux Klan Act. However, prompt relief provided thru this federal lawsuit can render review by U.S.S.C. unnecessary decreasing the burden on U.S.S.C.

83.    Plaintiff requested Judge Strauss that GIC 880565 be moved to a federal court. The ACTION of GIC 880565 is discrimination by Dean Hayhurst against Plaintiff, followed by retaliation for complaining about discrimination by Dean Hayhurst against Plaintiff. See Exhibit 7.

84.    On or around January 13, 2003, Dr. David T. Hayhurst, Dean of the College of Engineering recommended that Plaintiff not be promoted with the awarding of tenure. At that time Dean Hayhurst also made recommendations to two other candidates, Dr. Karen Newman, and Dr. Tom Impuellso. At the time Dean Hayhurst made his recommendation, Plaintiff was the top candidate in the college, the only one recommended for tenure and promotion by the College of Engineering Committee.

85.    The College of Engineering Committee had clearly stated in their review that Plaintiff had met all established criteria for tenure and promotion.

86.    Dean Hayhurst recommended that Dr. Newman be early promoted with the granting of tenure even though he did not recommend her with enthusiasm. Plaintiff was happy for Dr. Newman and congratulated her.

87.    Plaintiff told his faculty union about discrimination by Dean Hayhurst against Plaintiff. Plaintiff also complained about it to Whistle Blower Officer and Associate Vice President for Faculty Affairs, Dr. Dean Popp, and asked him to go over the performance evaluation letters. Dr. Popp communicated with the faculty union regularly.

88.    Then since it was too late to write another rebuttal to Dean Hayhurst, Plaintiff wrote it as a letter/response to the University Promotion and Tenure Review Panel stating,

"...at the time Dean wrote his letters of recommendation, I was the top candidate in the college, i.e., the only one recommended by the college committee for tenure and promotion.......... This is discrimination. The Dean who is new to SDSU, has ignored the fact that the college committee made it's recommendation based on the criteria that has guided tenure and promotion in the past. But then, recalling for the record, this is consistent with the Dean's openly made statement during his "interview" presentations to the college of engineering which I attended, and where he stated that he would have different tenure and promotion requirements for different faculty, similar to what he practised at the University of Southern Alabama."

89.    Plaintiff showed the letter to Dr. Popp and asked him for advice. Dr. Popp looked at the letter and told Plaintiff "If you turn this in now, you will get tenure and promotion this year but you will burn a few bridges for the future. If you don’t turn it in, you will get it next year. I will bet you." Plaintiff turned in that letter on March 25, 2003. Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp reports directly to Provost Marlin and President Weber.

90.    This March 25, 2003 letter and the reply from the University Panel was additionally to be distributed to a) Plaintiff’s Dept. Committee Chair, b) Plaintiff’s Dept. Chair, c) College of Engineering Committee Chair, d) Dean Hayhurst, e) Plaintiff, f) College RTP Rep., and g) Dr. Popp. It is Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp’s office that distributes Plaintiff’s letter together with the reply from the University Panel.

91.    In the gymnasium, Plaintiff told Professor Paul Kolen exactly what Dr. Popp had said, i.e., "If you turn this in now, you will get tenure and promotion this year but you will burn a few bridges for the future. If you don’t turn it in, you will get it next year. I will bet you." and Professor Kolen said "Oh you will get it this year then. I wouldn't have waited for next year either ".

92.    Plaintiff also told Dr. Popp regarding the faculty search for the distinguished Pine Professorship in Computer Engineering and the excellent female applicant not being invited for an interview. On April 10, 2003 Plaintiff noted that an Equal Opportunity Specialist (EOS), Ms. Janice Taylor, J.D., from the Office of Diversity and Equity (ODE) was present at a meeting where the Pine Professorship position was being discussed. That was the first and last time Plaintiff had noted an ODE officer participate in a department meeting where candidates were being ranked.

93.    EOS Taylor later under oath stated that something had come up with regards to Dean Hayhurst and she was told by the Director of the Office of Diversity that she needed to take copious notes and keep good files to protect their office. EOS Taylor met with Dean Hayhurst on April 17, 2003.

94.    Plaintiff met with Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp in May of 2003, after not getting tenure and promotion as promised. Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp knew that Plaintiff’s departmental teaching award (controlled by faculty and administration) was taken away after inquiry and interest from Dean Hayhurst’s office. Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp asked Plaintiff if Plaintiff was going to quit and go work in industry.

95.    Dr. Len Marino who sat on the University Panel around May 2003 had told Plaintiff that he had talked with Provost Marlin and she only wanted to see one more publication and it can be a conference publication. Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp had echoed the same requirements from Provost Marlin to get tenure and promotion in 2004.

96.    Plaintiff finished his work in progress, returned in late August 2003, comfortably exceeding the target provided by Provost Marlin of one conference publication to get tenure and promotion to associate professor in 2004. Plaintiff returned with one conference publication and two journal publications. Plaintiff reported one conference and one journal publication and saved reporting one journal publication for the next promotion step at a later time to full professor.

97.    Towards the end of summer 2003, Plaintiff also got his 8 personal data summary (PDS) binders back. According to university rules, if Plaintiff’s March 25, 2003 letter (accusing Dean Hayhurst of discrimination) to the University Tenure and Review Panel was to be distributed, then Plaintiff must be copied the signed response from the University Panel chair and Whistle Blower Officer Dr. Popp’s office shall place copies of letter and reply in each PDS binder upon receipt.

98.    The identical PDS binders returned to Plaintiff had only information prior to March of 2003.

99.    Plaintiff saw the signed reply by the University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel chair Dr. Terry Cronan for the FIRST TIME in February 2005.

100.    Professor C. T. Chang never received the March 25, 2003 letter as indicated in his deposition of December 2004, and he never mentioned it to Plaintiff at anytime during their conversations between March 2003 and January 2005. Department Chair Tummala apparently never saw it either as indicated in his checklist review of Plaintiff’s submission of material for 2003-2004 review cycle where department chair verifies that previous years recommendation letters and rebuttals/responses are included in the material. Dr. Leonard Marino, a member of the University Panel, when asked about the letter dated March 25, 2003 hadn’t seen or heard about it before.

101.    EOS Taylor claims she left work that she loved at SDSU on September 11, 2003. EOS Taylor’s contract would have renewed in October 2003. EOS Taylor was let go early with pay. EOS Taylor’s notes, emails, and all employment/discrimination case files were disposed or destroyed by Defendants. The retaliation and termination campaign restarted furiously in fall 2003.

102.    Dean Hayhurst’s office tried to pressure the Department Committee to deny Plaintiff tenure in 2004. Dr. C. T. Chang was the chair of the committee.

103.    The Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering had recommended Plaintiff be granted both tenure and promotion and stated that Plaintiff’s overall performance has been very good.

104.    Moreover, in Plaintiff’s case, the College of Engineering committee reviewed his case and had recommended both tenure and promotion as Plaintiff had met all established requirements for tenure and promotion.

105.    Prior to Plaintiff’s complaining about discrimination by Dean Hayhurst, on January 13, 2003, Dean Hayhurst, in his performance review of the Plaintiff, recommended that he continue publishing in well-recognized peer-reviewed journals, that he seek funding for his research projects, that he begin incorporating graduate students in his research and that he conduct research separately and independently from his dissertation advisor.

106.    Plaintiff did all of those acts, which Dean Hayhurst dismissed on January 14, 2004 as last minute efforts, and in retaliation, recommended that Plaintiff be terminated.

107.    CSU General Counsel and SDSU additionally violated state and federal laws by coercing, intimidating and retaliating against their employees willing to tell the truth and come forward in a civil rights case. Dr. C. T. Chang, with regard to Plaintiff’s scholarly work, in his deposition on December 14, 2004 stated in front of him, (quoted verbatim, Chang unsigned deposition, page 44, lines 9-12,)

“All published in the reasonable good journal, like the one IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineering. Another one in the – another one in the IEE, which is a British electronic letter, also high quality journal. And we recommend him positively.”

The verbatim testimony was replaced around January 2005 to,

“All published in the reasonable good journals, like IEEE Transactions, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineering. Another one in the IEE Electronic Letters, which is a British publication of high quality. And we recommend him positively.”

Dr. C.T. Chang is passionate about the journal IEE electronic letter being a top journal. Dr. Chang’s testimony would not help Defendants. CSU-SDSU made Dr. Chang re-write, or themselves altered his deposition.

108.    Prior to Summary Judgment, on June 30, 2005, Dean Hayhurst under oath gets caught trying to deceit trial court (perjures and gets impeached) with regards to Plaintiff’s publication being a journal as it would imply that Plaintiff had done what he had recommended the previous year (Hayhurst Dep. Pg. 46.) See Exhibit 38, pg. 471.

109.    Defendants engaged in systematic fraudulent unlawful destruction and disposing of EOS Taylor’s notes, emails, and all employment/discrimination records at the Office of Diversity & Equity.

110.    Similarly, all of Dr. Chang’s computer’s data was wiped clean by a College of Engineering Technician. In particular, Dr. Chang’s testimony (Chang deposition, Dec. 14, 2004, Pg. 16, Lines 10-21,)

Q. All right. Now, is this the original letter that you wrote?

A. This is after several modification.

Q. The first letter that you wrote, do you have a copy of that?

A. I don’t.

Q. All right.

A. As a matter of fact, wipe out by the college of engineering computer technician only a month or two ago, and then my computer have virus and I want to get rid of it, instead they got rid of every file I have.

111.    The files would have shown Professor Len Marino amongst others indicating that the performance evaluation letter for Plaintiff should be all positive as Plaintiff had exceeded Provost Marlin’s provided target. Dr. Marino was also helping Dr. Chang write a nice letter for Plaintiff.

112.    CSU-SDSU fraudulently violated state and federal laws by altering or destroying evidence. See Cal. Gov. Code 12946. There is no mention of Cal. Gov. Code 12946 in any pleadings or rulings of Singh I. No one, including Attorney Golden or Judge Cowett ever mentioned 12946.

113.    Plaintiff’s Attorney Golden informed President Weber starting August 4, 2004, regarding the involvement of Office and Diversity and Equity in the gender discrimination investigation. See (Exhibit 36, pgs. 449-451.) The lawsuit was filed in October of 2004. Attorney Westover is in-house attorney for CSU General Counsel and did an internal investigation regarding Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (Exhibit 11.) Attorney Westover and SDSU had Ms. Taylor’s address and telephone number. Attorney Westover did not contact Ms. Taylor at anytime between August 2004 and February 2005. When Plaintiff requested,

“all documents regarding or referring to any review or investigation of Plaintiff’s claim,”

in-house Attorney Westover responded in February 2005, (Exhibit 11,)

“Objection. Seeks documents protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege and attorney work product doctrine (including the files of CSU’s Office of General Counsel, which has investigated Plaintiff’s claims in the course of the governmental claim and litigation). Subject to and without waiving these objections, CSU responds as follows: The only relevant non-privileged investigation materials would be those involving the Pine Chair search. However, when Janice Taylor left her employment at SDSU, she apparently took with her or otherwise disposed of all her case files, and left no documentation at SDSU. Thus, despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, CSU is unable to comply with this request, since the documents are no longer in CSU’s possession, custody, or control.”

In-house Attorney Westover, in February 2005, had repeatedly accused Ms. Taylor of taking or disposing of all her discrimination case files.

114.    President Weber is in charge of the Office of Diversity and Equity. President Weber is chartered with eradicating discrimination and retaliation from SDSU campus. President Weber is aware of unlawful acts being committed by SDSU and CSU General Counsel.

115.    California State University’s Chancellor Reed is in charge of the CSU Office of the General Counsel and is also aware of the unlawful acts being committed both by SDSU and CSU General Counsel.

116.    Plaintiff on March 12, 2007 in pleadings asked Judge Strauss to immediately unearth Attorney Fraud. Plaintiff on April 27, 2007, again requested in pleadings submitted to Superior Court, (see Exhibit 41,)

Dr. Rahul Singh
9974 Scripps Ranch Blvd, #230
San Diego, CA 92131
PH: 619-392-3759


SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

RAHUL SINGH,                                                      Case No.: GIC 880565
        Plaintiff,
vs.                                                                               NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, et, al.,            APPLICATION/MOTION &
Defendants.                                                               APPLICATION/MOTION FOR COURT
                                                                                     ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF
                                                                                     DOCUMENT.

                                                                                     Hearing Date: May 2, 2007
                                                                                     Time: 9 AM
                                                                                     Dept. 75
                                                                                     Judge: Hon. Richard E. L Strauss

                                                                                     Date of Filing: February 21, 2007
                                                                                     TRIAL DATE: TBD
_______________________________

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Wednesday, May 2, 2007, at 9 AM, Plaintiff Rahul Singh will make an ex parte application to the court to order Defendant and Attorney Susan Westover to submit to this court the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

1) As explained in Plaintiff’s reply to Defendants notice of related case, Attorney Susan Westover committed perjury, i.e., Fraud Upon the Court. In hiding unlawful fraudulent Attorney collusion, & concealing and tampering of evidence by Attorneys (also Fraud on the Court,) Attorney Westover lied and wrote to Trial Court under penalty of perjury that Plaintiff actually produced the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook to the University in response its request for production to him. See Exhibit 1.

2) The court should note that Defendants and Attorney Westover did not include in their Answer to the Complaint, an exhibit containing the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

3) The civil rights act of 1964 and 1991 allow the court to join in and eradicate unlawful discrimination and retaliation, tampering and destruction of employment and discrimination records, and Fraud Upon the Court. Additionally see (Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., (1946) 328 U.S. 575, 580,) and (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., (1944) 328 U.S. 238.)

4) Judge Strauss should immediately order Attorney Westover and Defendant’s to:

Present to his court the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

5) In any litigation, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, echoing the opinion of the United States Supreme Court and other courts, in (Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 2003, 354 S.C. 72, 83-84,)

“Attorney fraud calls into question the integrity of the judiciary and erodes public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Accordingly, where an attorney embarks on a scheme to either suborn perjury or intentionally conceal documents, extrinsic fraud constituting a fraud upon the court occurs.”
“ We note because fraud upon the court is an affront to the administration of justice, a litigant who has been defrauded need not establish prejudice. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra; Dixon v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003) (“ . . . the perpetrator of the fraud [upon the court] should not be allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud after the fact.”).”

6) The temple of justice has been defiled. The doctrines of Throckmorton, Hazel, Chewning and cases on extrinsic fraud are controlling whenever Attorneys, Agents, or other Officers of the Government are false in their duty to it, or that they assist or connive at the fraud; whenever the Attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side; whenever Attorneys commit perjury to Trial Court; whenever there is concealing and tampering of evidence by Attorneys. See (Unites States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61,) (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. (1944) 322 U.S. 238,) (Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., (1946) 328 U.S. 575, 580,) (Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 2003, 354 S.C. 72,) (Granzella v. Jaroyehen (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 551,) (Caldwell v. Taylor (1933) 218 Cal. 471.)

7) On pages 82-83, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Chewning, noted,

“Moreover, we note that, while their analysis does not turn on the categorization of fraud as intrinsic or extrinsic, numerous jurisdictions hold an attorney’s subornation of perjury and/or the intentional concealment of documents constitute fraud upon the court. See Kupferman v. Consol. Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1972) (institution of action by attorney who knew that there was complete defense to action might be fraud upon the court); Great Coastal Express, Inc., v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1357 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[I]nvolvement of an attorney, as an officer of the court, in a scheme to suborn perjury would certainly be considered fraud on the court.”); Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1987) (“A verdict may be set aside for fraud on the court if an attorney and a witness have conspired to present perjured testimony.”); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (fabrication of evidence where attorney is implicated is fraud upon the court); H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 536 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court.”); Dixon v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003) (fraud on the court occurred where attorneys entered into secret settlement agreements with taxpayers in exchange for false testimony); Synanon Found., Inc., v. Bernstein, 503 A.2d 1254 (D.C. 1986) (attorney subornation of perjury and false statements to trial court constitute fraud upon the court); Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 78 F.R.D. 499 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (noting distinction between perjury involving officers of the court and witness or party); see 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 60-21[4][b] (3d ed. 2002.)”

8) The United States Supreme Court is equally clear in (Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (1982), 458 U.S. 219, 226,)

“Moreover, as we emphasized in Albemarle Paper, in Title VII cases


"such discretionary choices are not left to a court's `inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to [Page 458 U.S. 219, 227] be guided by sound legal principles.' United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.). . . . "It is true that `[e]quity eschews mechanical rules . . . [and] depends on flexibility.' Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 O.S. 392, 396 (1946). But when Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes and not `equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's foot.' Important national goals would be frustrated by a regime of discretion that `produce[d] different results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970)." Id., at 416-417 (footnote omitted).”

Congress' purpose in vesting a variety of "discretionary" powers in the courts was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the "fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible." See (Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, (1975) 422 U.S. 405, 421.)

9) In (Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., (2000) 530 U.S. 133, 147,)

“… it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Specifically, we stated:
"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Id., at 511.
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at 517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination"). In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296 (1992);”

CONCLUSION

Superior Court must unearth Fraud Upon the Court and provide swift justice for Plaintiff in tune with Albemarle.

Dated April 26, 2007                   Respectfully submitted, …

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

I, Rahul Singh declare as follows:
A true and correct copy of Attorney Susan Westover’s declaration dated October 10, 2005 is given in Exhibit 1. Issuing the simple order will unearth Fraud Upon the Court. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that foregoing is true and correct. Executed April 26, 2007, at San Deigo, California. …”

117.   Plaintiff submitted the simple order for Judge Strauss to sign, Exhibit 42,

“Dr. Rahul Singh
9974 Scripps Ranch Blvd, #230
San Diego, CA 92131
PH: 619-392-3759


SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

RAHUL SINGH,
      Plaintiff,                                                                         Case No.: GIC 880565
       vs.
SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, et, al.,                     [PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED] ORDER
      Defendants.                                                                   GRANTING MOTION FOR COURT
                                                                                               ORDER.

                                                                                                Date: May 2, 2007
                                                                                                Time: 9 AM
                                                                                                Dept. 75
                                                                                                Judge: Hon. Richard E. L Strauss

                                                                                                Date of Filing: February 21, 2007
                                                                                                TRIAL DATE: TBD
_________________________________


      Plaintiff Rahul Singh’s motion for court order is hereby granted.

      1.       Defendant and Attorney Susan Westover are to submit to this court the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                            SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
                                                            COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

DATED: __________________        ____________________________
                                                             Hon.
                                                            Judge of the Superior Court”

118.    Judge Strauss did not want to unearth criminal acts by Attorneys in Plaintiff’s Title VII case. Judge Strauss at the May 2, 2007 hearing asked Plaintiff to instead file a regular noticed motion even though Plaintiff had obtained the May 2, 2007 date from the court since it was a simple motion for document production.

119.    Judge Strauss also received Defendants reply to Plaintiff’s May 2, 2007 ex-parte that did not contain as an exhibit the red Handbook supposedly produced by Plaintiff to the University in response its request for production to him. See Exhibit 43.

120.    Plaintiff filed a noticed motion and proposed order on May 10, 2007. See Exhibit 44. It was to be heard on June 22, 2007. Proof of service is given in Exhibit 45. Defendant filed a motion on May 16, 2007 that the court allowed to be heard on June 8, 2007. Fraud and Deceit prevented Plaintiff’s May 10, 2007 from being heard. Plaintiff on June 5, 2007 requested Judge Strauss that the case be moved to a federal court; it was filed as “PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO MOVE CASE TO FEDERAL COURT; ALSO SERVES AS PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S MAY 16, 2007 MOTION; ALSO SERVES AS ADDENDUM TO PLAINTIFF’S MAY 10, 2007 MOTION YET TO BE HEARD.”

121.    In (Wells v. Zenz (1927) 83 C.A.2d 137, 140,)

“Fraud is defined as a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another. No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and unfair way by which another is deceived.”

122.    On June 8, 2007, Judge Strauss had in front of him an Attorney that committed criminal acts against a Title VII Plaintiff, (Exhibit 46,)

“SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, FRIADAY, JUNE 8, 2007, 2:05 P.M.

                                                          – – 000 – –

THE CLERK: NUMBER. 25, SINGH VS. SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY.

MS. WESTOVER: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. SUSAN WESTOVER FOR ALL DEFENDANTS.

MR. SINGH: RAHUL SINGH FOR PLAINTIFF. I AM THE PLAINTIFF.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I REALLY DON’T WANT TO BE TRYING THINGS IN MULTIPLE PLACES. HOW DO WE MANAGE ALL THIS?

MS. WESTOVER: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE REMITTITUR RIGHT NOW, IN THE FIRST CASE, IS SCHEDULED TO BE ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL ON JUNE 18TH. PLAINTIFF JUST THIS LAST WEEK FILED PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, BUT THE DEADLINE FOR THE COURT OF APPEAL ANTICIPATES THAT WE ARE CALENDARING THE REMITTITUR. THERE WAS ONE POSSIBILITY, THAT THE SUPREME COURT WILL EXTEND ITS TIME TO DECIDE THE CASE, EXTEND IT 30 DAYS.

SO I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE SET IT RIGHT NOW, PICK AND SELECT A HEARING DATE ON OUR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, BASED ON THE RES JUDICATA DEFENSE, AND SCHEDULE THAT SOMETIME IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER. BY THAT TIME, ANY POSSIBLE TIME FOR EXTENSION ON THE REMITTITUR WILL HAVE GONE BY AND WE CAN SIMPLY GET THE MATTER ON CALENDAR WITH THIS COURT.

THE COURT: WHAT’S YOUR VIEW?

MR. SINGH: MY VIEW IS THAT THE PERPETRATOR OF THE FRAUD UPON THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ABUSE THE FRAUD AFTER THE FACT. I WOULD REALLY LIKE TIME TO MAKE MY CASE.

THE COURT: ARE ALL THE ISSUES PENDING ON APPEAL NOW?

MS. WESTOVER: ALL ISSUES.

THE COURT: SAME ISSUES AS HERE?

MR. SINGH: NO, YOUR HONOR.

MS. WESTOVER: SAME ISSUES.

THE COURT: NO?

MR. SINGH: NO.

THE COURT: WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?

MR. SINGH: WELL, I’M LOOKING AT THE RULING ON THE INTERNET. I GUESS I COULD SAY THE UNOPPPOSED MOTION. THERE WAS A LATE REPLY, WHICH WAS TITLED “PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO MOVE CASE TO FEDERAL COURT.” IT ALSO SERVES AS A REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S MAY 16TH, 2007 MOTION, ALSO SERVES AS AN ADDENDUM TO PLAINTIFF’S MAY 10TH, 2007 MOTION, YET TO BE HEARD.

THE ISSUES ARE NOT IDENTICAL. THIS CASE IS FOR DISCRIMINATION BY DEAN HAYHURST AGAINST PLAINTIFF, MYSELF. THE FEHA COMPLAINT WAS FILED ON FEBRUARY 23RD, 2006. THE CASE PENDING IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT IS RETALIATION FOR COMPLAINING ABOUT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A HIGHLY QUALIFIED FEMALE APPLICANT WITH 40 JOURNAL PAPERS, 100 CONFERENCE PAPERS, 28 PATENTS, AND AN EXCELLENT MATCH FOR THE JOB DESCRIPTION.

THE RULING CONTRADICTS THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN HAZEL-ATLAS IS VERY CLEAR. ATTORNEY FR